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Abstract 
 
 
This paper examines the effects of traditional issue-specific commercial mortgage 
backed securities (CMBS) variables on US CMBS spreads. In addition, a decomposition of 
the Conference Board’s US Leading Economic Indicators (LEI) Index will be examined for 
each of the ten component’s explanatory power for US CMBS spreads. A qualitative 
examination of the history and setting of the US subprime crisis, features of US CMBS, and 
an outline of The Conference Board’s US LEI components are provided. This is followed by 
an explanation of assumptions and the methodology used for the statistical analysis of the 
fourteen variables on CMBS spreads. In addition, the NA REIT Composite Index Dividend 
Yield is hypothesized to contribute to the CMBS spreads. A conclusion will contain results 
and proposals for an improved model, in contrast to Jadeja and Dorokov (Summer 2008). 
This paper closes with a discussion of possible sources of errors and guidance for future 
studies. 
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Executive Summary 
 
 
There is a multitude of variables that influence the spreads of Commercial Mortgage 
Backed Securities (CMBS). The three traditional issue-specific factors are the CMBS rating 
(RAT), the loan-to-value ratio (LTV), and the debt-to-service coverage ratio (DSC). Also, the 
percentage of subordinate debt of a CMBS issue (SUB) is widely considered an integral 
determinate of spreads. These four traditional issue-specific variables combined with various 
macroeconomic influences are hypothesized to significantly affect CMBS spreads.  
 
Empirically, this paper finds CMBS ratings as the dominate driver of CMBS spreads. 
While LTV, DSC, and SUB are less sensitive than RAT, these variables are still statistically 
significant. This result is consistent with the findings of Jadeja and Dorokov (2008). 
Subsequently, the Conference Board’s ten US Leading Economic Indicators (LEI) 
components are analyzed for their qualitative relevance and quantitative explanatory value in 
determining standardized CMBS spreads. Most of these individual component results are 
insignificant; however, as a group of indicators, they are significant and contribute to 
improving the explanatory power of the CMBS spreads model. Surprisingly, with the 
addition of the NA REIT Composite Index Dividend Yield, this model specification led to a 
lower coefficient of determination for standardized CMBS spreads in comparison to the 
proposed Ten Factor Hybrid Model.   
 
The statistical test results of Jadeja and Dorokov (2008) are verified and differences 
are reconciled. Various model specifications are proposed, analyzed, and discussed in the 
context of statistical regressions. A comparison of the results from this paper’s proposed 
Ten Factor Hybrid Model for CMBS spreads will demonstrate an improvement in the 
coefficient of determination, the F-statistic, and the Durbin Watson statistic over the Three 
Factor Model (RAT, SUB, and DSC) proposed by Jadeja and Dorokov (2008). The 
conclusion will yield an improved proposed model specification for CMBS pricing (the Ten 
Factor Hybrid Model), possible sources of errors, and guidance for future studies. 
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 ualitative Fundamentals 
History and Setting of the US Subprime and CMBS Crisis 
 
The year 2008 will be characterized in history by the insolvencies of many iconic US 
In March 2000, the Nasdaq Composite Index reached its pinnacle of 5,049; and in 
During the time period between December 2001 and November 2004, the US 
Due to the resilience of US nominal and real housing prices from 1998, even before 
the technology bubble imploded, coupled with historically low interest rates, the confidence 
 
Q
 
 
 
 
financial institutions such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Countrywide Financial, 
and Washington Mutual. However, the reasons for the demise of these US financial pillars 
were gradual and compounding, as opposed to sudden and overnight. 
 
 
October 2002, the Nasdaq Composite Index troughed at 1,116. In about two and a half 
years, 77.9% of the Nasdaq Composite market capitalization was erased. Financiers felt a 
sense of resentment towards publically traded equities after the technology bubble burst, in 
conjunction with a drastically lowered risk appetite. A national portfolio rebalancing towards 
asset classes with low systematic risk and lower perceived risk quickly followed.  
 
 
federal funds target interest rate remained below 2%. This expansive monetary policy 
stimulated investment and consumption with lower opportunity costs of capital. However, 
insurance companies, and to some extent pension funds, would unlikely be able to cover 
their fixed liabilities with low yielding US Treasuries. Thus, in efforts to avoid defaulting on 
these liabilities, firms of this nature commenced a search for higher yields for future viability. 
It is important to note that as US interest rates were declining, a global appreciation of 
housing and other asset prices materialized.i  This set the stage for the US commercial and 
residential real estate bubbles. 
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in the US real estate asset class increased for investors.ii  With this realization along with an 
increasing market demand for high yielding securities, investment banks commenced 
underwritings of financially engineered products. This led to the proliferation of the 
collateralized debt obligation (CDO) securities. 
 
 This new demand for CDO securities was unprecedented; but more importantly, it 
as an extraordinary event as opposed to a sustainable event. The CDO market itself was 
nks and mortgage firms operate in the entrepreneurial worldview 
here material abundance is respected, the individual reigns supreme, and the velocity of 
decision
housing 
market bubble. Expectations of continued rising housing prices, refinancing mortgages at 
lower r
w
strong enough to drive demand for underlying mortgages in and of themselves.iii  In turn, 
these mortgage originations further inflated housing prices. The investment banks and their 
structured finance vehicles drove demand for subprime mortgages from the mortgage-
originating lenders. These lenders prospered from each incremental mortgage origination. 
Lending standards started to deteriorate as greed and potential for material abundance 
prevailed. Although this fact was a major factor for RMBS crisis, this was the primary factor 
for the CMBS crisis.  
 
Investment ba
w
-making is valued.iv  Compliance becomes an impediment to velocity and that in 
itself, hinders a mortgage lending agent from heightened material compensation. Thus, it 
should be expected that lending standards fall in this setting, and indeed they did.    
 
Assumptions that should be questioned remained unquestioned in the 
ates, and improving credit scores are not rational and sustainable assumptions. Also, 
traditional CDOs invested in unique pools of corporate loans and bonds. Systematic risks 
are determined by holding various proportions of cyclical and counter-cyclical industries 
within the pool. However, the Asset Backed (ABS) CDO securities are dictated by economic 
factors on a national level such as interest rates, housing prices, and the labor market; these 
systematic risks are non-diversifiable. A critical assumption that ABS CDO securities could 
diversify systematic risks like traditional CDO securities was a fallacy. Thus, in the event of a 
collapse in housing prices or national economic malaise, the erroneous low beta assumption 
of the CDO would have severe consequences as this economic assumption is critical in 
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structuring ABS CDOs. v   However, one major assumption differs for the CMBS case: 
commercial real estate pricing is cyclical. In hindsight, the CMBS case is even tougher to 
digest with this historical fact in mind. 
 
A seemingly more cohesive assumption is that the CDO ratings provided by the big 
three rating agencies, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch, are objective and justified. However, 
conflict
A resilient US housing market from 1998 through 2006, unparalleled demand for 
high yielding securities in a low interest rate environment, fallacious low systematic risk 
CDO a
ime crisis outlined has 
fected the less affluent; however, easy credit was a widespread disease. Any loan to any 
borrow
s of interests between underwriters and rating agencies plague objectivity and 
justification for CDO issue ratings. The rating agencies become a consultant to the 
underwriters to achieve desired ratings. The compensation scheme in itself is a conflict of 
interest – the rating agencies are compensated by the underwriters. vi   This is a typical 
example of agent capture.vii  Less sophisticated and smaller financial institutions relied more 
on ratings provided by the big three credit rating agencies than larger and more sophisticated 
financial institutions.viii  This factor was more significant for the RMBS crisis as opposed to 
the CMBS crisis. Commercial properties are more flexible and easier to transform for other 
functions; thus, the CMBS are less susceptible to precipitous price drops than RMBS, status 
quo.   
 
ssumptions, and conflicts of interest between rating agencies and underwriters 
leading to artificially high CDO issue ratings, together, created the foundation for the 
subprime crisis to germinate, fester, and infect the global financial system. The story for the 
CMBS market has many parallel similarities with the subprime RMBS crisis: the low interest 
rate environment drove demand for higher yielding securities, the conflicts of interest 
between rating agencies and the underwriters leading to inflated CMBS ratings, and the 
widespread deteriorating lending standards of financial institutions.  
 
On topic with the 2007 US Recession, the current subpr
af
er could be classified as subprime if there is inadequate down-payment or an 
exorbitant amount of debt. This is an issue of concern for the commercial real estate market. 
Commercial properties of various types enjoyed significant price appreciation since the 
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beginning of this century and delinquencies had fallen to record lows in early 2007. However, 
the possible implosion of the CMBS market will be markedly different than the RMBS 
precipitous fall: there are no targets of predatory lending and there were no failures by 
government regulators. ix   The public does not have the less affluent US citizens to 
commiserate with for the CMBS scenario as opposed to the RMBS scenario. The corporate 
and institutional greed for incremental profit has led to a probably CMBS crisis.  
 
The commercial real estate market crisis will yield less detrimental affects than the 
recent housing crisis. It is a smaller market in aggregate and the buildings have a diversified 
group o
d per issue, 
and the amount of leverage applied have pushed the CMBS market into a state of irrational 
exubera
 This recession is 
largely attributed to the simultaneous collapse of the national housing bubble and the 
aggrava
f tenants with various sources of income. In 1995, $15.7 Billion of CMBS were 
issued; in the first three quarters of 2007, $196.9 Billion of CMBS were issued.x  The market 
size for outstanding CMBS issues is $730 Billion. It is important to note that the supply of 
commercial real estate was proportionally much less than the residential market and 
commercial real estate is easily renovated for a multitude of uses and functions. 
 
Falling lending standards, excessive levels of greed, lofty ratings grante
nce.xi  The security underwriting rate was unsustainable, money supply is finite, and 
the market was further spurred with fallen lending standards and undeservingly high ratings. 
Commercial real estate is cyclical; Wall Street anticipated an inevitable market crash. The 
corporations and institutions that have created the CMBS disarray will be held accountable, 
slandered, and shown no mercy by the public media and societal factions.  
 
The most recent US recession commenced in December 2007.xii 
ting subprime mortgage crisis in 2006. In November 2008, there have been arising 
fears of probable widespread distress in the US commercial mortgage back securities (CMBS) 
market as indicated by record high risk premiums.xiii  With this possible scenario becoming 
an economic reality, a study of issue specific and macroeconomic variables influencing 
CMBS spreads is pertinent and insightful to the persevering US economic environment. 
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 US Commercial Mortgage Back Security Features 
 
 
mortgage market is comprised of two divisions: the residential mortgage 
arket typically includes properties with one to four single family units; and the commercial 
 to finance a new purchase or refinance an 
xisting commercial mortgage obligation. CMBS are non-recourse loans: there is no reliance 
ary market demand for ABS CDO securities 
as due to tranching. Although tranching does not reduce the absolute degree of risk 
edictors of CMBS performance are the CMBS ratings 
AT), percentage of subordinate debt (SUB), loan-to-value ratio (LTV), and the debt-to-
 
 
 The US 
m
mortgage market includes income-producing properties such as apartment buildings, office 
buildings, industrial warehouse properties, shopping centers, hotels, and health care facilities 
for senior housing care and retirement homes.xiv  The focus of this paper is strictly within 
the confines of the US commercial mortgage market. 
 
 Commercial mortgage loans are originated
e
on the capacity of the borrower to repay. Thus, the CMBS holder is only able to depend on 
the income-generating property backing the loan for interest and principal repayment. If the 
CMBS were to default partially or fully, there will be no recourse to the borrower for the 
outstanding unpaid balance; however, the holder of the CMBS has an option to consider 
selling the property for repayment proceeds.xv 
 
 A significant reason for the extraordin
w
associated with a pool of mortgages, it does distribute risk to various tranches in different 
degrees.xvi  Each tranch is analyzed by its relevant expected cash flows for its respective 
property; thus, each tranch contains unique risks and is priced accordingly. Payouts from the 
ABS CDO pool were first allocated to the least risky senior tranches, then the mezzanine 
tranches and lastly to the most risky equity tranches. Consistent with each tranch’s risk 
characterization, losses were first allocated to equity tranches, then to the mezzanines, and 
only lastly to the senior tranches.xvii 
 
 The four traditional key pr
(R
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service coverage ratio (DSC). The CMBS issue rating is provided by the big three credit 
rating agencies: Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. The higher the SUB of a CMBS 
issue approximates the issues’ higher sensitivities to riskier tranches and payment default, 
status quo. The LTV ratio for CMBS analysis is similar to a price-to-earnings metric for 
equity analysis. The numerator (loan) is defined as the outstanding loan amount, and the 
denominator (value) is defined as the present value of expected cash flows discounted at a 
specified capitalization rate. Thus, the value for the loan figure is the future net operating 
income (NOI), rental income subtracting cash operating expenses, discounted by a single 
capitalization rate. This is significantly different from a residential mortgage backed security 
(RMBS) as RMBS use a market or appraisal figure for value. Therefore, analysts are skeptical 
about the forecasting of expected cash flow generation and usage of a single, blunt 
capitalization rate for resulting LTV ratios reported. Lastly, the DSC ratio is defined as the 
NOI divided by debt service. A ratio greater than one suggests that the income generated 
from the property is sufficient to cover debt servicing. Thus, DSC ratio may vary due to 
NOI estimates, but to a significantly lesser extent than LTV ratio as discounting is a non-
factor.  
 
 In general, CMBS are less exposed to prepayment risk than RMBS. On the loan level, 
MBS usually entail prepayment penalty mechanisms in the form of prepayment penalty 
cenario analysis with varying assumptions of 
efault risk, conditional default rate, timing of defaults, concentration of property geography, 
C
points, yield maintenance charges, or specific lockout periods. Defeasance is a popular 
mechanism used as funds intended for prepayment are then invested in US Treasury 
portfolios. In essence, defeasance mitigates proportional CMBS credit risk exposure since it 
is indirectly backed by prepayment funds invested in US Treasuries. There are also 
mechanisms on the CMBS structural level acting as call protections. Due to these loan and 
structural level CMBS call protections, CMBS trade more similarly to traditional corporate 
bonds in contrast to a non-agency RMBS.xviii 
 
 Stress tests with Monte Carlo and s
d
and percentage of loss severity are performed to understand sensitivities and risks associated 
with CMBS. General risks associated with mortgages include credit risk, liquidity risk, 
interest rate risk, and prepayment risk.  
 25
  Comprehension of these general features of the commercial mortgage market and 
MBS lead to a better understanding of the composition of ABS CDO securities. A C
portfolio or pool of various heterogeneous CMBS issues, in whole or in part, serves as the 
fundamental inputs comprising of CMBS CDO securities. 
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US Leading Economic Indicators Introduction 
 
The Conference Board (CB) is a not-for-profit organization that amalgamates, 
alyzes, and disseminates information about economic-based forecasts and market trends 
ng is a discussion of each of the LEI components: (1) Manufacturer 
verage Work Week (MFG) measures the average work week in hours of manufacturing 
employ
 
 
an
for over the past 90 years.xix  The CB US Leading Economic Indicators (LEI) and its ten 
components will be scrutinized in this paper. Although a dichotomous LEI index classified 
into periods of expansions for predicting peaks and periods of contractions for predicting 
troughs will lead to higher coefficients of determination, the focus will be on the individual 
LEI components.  
 
The followi
A
ees in the US. Theoretically, trends in MFG contribute to general economic 
forecasting not only on an absolute expansion or contraction level, but on a rate of change 
level as well. This statistic is recorded monthly. (2) Initial Jobless Claims (JOB) is a measure 
of the number of people filing first-time claims for state unemployment insurance.xx  The 
higher this number results in a higher unemployment statistic and forebodes lesser economic 
activity. This statistic is recorded weekly. (3) Seasonally Unadjusted Durable Goods and 
Materials New Orders (ODR_CM) notes the amount of total $US for new orders received 
from more than 4,000 manufacturers in more than 85 industries of durable goods in the US. 
Growth in ODR_CM has usually occurred in advance of general economic expansion. This 
statistic is recorded monthly.xxi  (4) Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI) is an indicator based 
on five major indicators: new orders, inventory levels, production, supplier deliveries and the 
employment environment. A measurement above 50 represents manufacturing sector 
expansion and below 50 signals manufacturer sector contraction.xxii  The PMI is measured 
on a monthly basis. (5) Seasonally Unadjusted Manufacturing Excluding Defense New 
Orders (ODR_XD) is similar to ODR_CM as it is measured in total $US for new orders 
received from manufacturers subtracting defense industry related orders. ODR_XD is also 
recorded monthly. (6) New Privately Owned Housing Units Authorized by Building Permits 
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in Permit-Issuing Places (BLD) is a proxy measure for housing starts. This metric notes the 
number of residential building construction projects that have commenced during a given 
month. The more people buying new houses signal economic strength and confidence for 
future prospects.xxiii  (7) The Standard and Poor’s 500 Index (SPX) is the most commonly 
used index to gauge the US large capitalization stock market performance. It includes 500 
stocks based on market capitalization, liquidity, and industry grouping among other factors. 
The S&P Index is market capitalization weighted and is measured daily.xxiv   (8) Inflation 
Adjusted M2 (AM2) is a measure of US national money supply. M2 includes M1 plus all 
time-related deposits, savings deposits, and non-institutional money-market funds.xxv  Money 
supply can predict inflationary and deflationary trends and is an important consideration for 
adjustments in interest rates. For this study, the CPI (January 1998 = 100, base year) is 
factored into the M2 figure in order to adjust for inflation. AM2 is reported on a monthly 
basis. (9) The Interest Rate Spread between the 10 Year US Treasury and the Federal Funds 
Rate (SPR_10FF) reflects how the market evaluates a longer term economic outlook. If the 
spreads widen and report a higher figure, the general expectation is that the economic 
outlook is weaker. Higher bond yields also attract investment funds from equity classes. This 
figure is recorded daily. And finally, (10) Expectations Portion of the University of 
Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index (CSI) is a measure of expected consumer sentiment. 
This figure is a monthly final output from a formula.xxvi  The higher the CSI reading for the 
month, the more comfortable consumers are about purchasing, thus, stimulating the 
economy. The CSI is measured monthly. Incorporating these ten measured variables 
through specified mathematical formulae, the CB produces a composite index with 
predictive implications on the US economy.  
 
 The methodology for computing the actual inputs into the statistical regression 
alysis will be discussed in the ensuing Quantitative Modeling and Results section.   an
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Quantitative Modeling and Results 
Generalizations and Assumptions 
  
As with any model that attempts to model reality, this model is a drastic 
f the real world. However, the findings and results do contribute to 
quares (OLS) model is utilized for the following analysis. OLS is 
nly one of many possible methods which a curve can be fitted with data.xxvii  This method 
 
 
 
 
simplification o
understanding how CMBS spreads vary with respect to traditional issue-specific and 
macroeconomic variables.  
 
 The ordinary least s
o
assumes a linear relationship between the dependent variable, the standardized CMBS 
spreads, and the independent variables, the traditional issue-specific and macroeconomic 
factors. This assumption is quite possibly violated in a realistic context. The “line of best fit” 
is that which minimizes that sum of squared deviations of the points of the graph from the 
points of the straight line, distances measured vertically.xxviii  Therefore, OLS regressions are 
very sensitive to outliers. In the spirit of retaining objectivity, no data points were discarded 
for all regressions in this paper. OLS assumes non-stochastic independent variables; and in 
addition, no exact linear relationship exists between two or more independent variables.xxix 
This assumption seems reasonable as inputs are from past recorded data. The error term for 
the regression has an expected value of zero. This could be a possible source of error as 
many indices are biased upward, even if not for the time periods relevant to this study (for 
example, S&P 500 index since inception). The error term of the OLS regression is assumed 
to have a constant variance for all observations. Volatility is unlikely constant throughout 
time and even doubtfully for the 1998 – 2008 time period of interest. The random variables 
are assumed statistically independent in OLS modeling. This is another possible violation 
since there are likely positive correlations among independent variables and negative 
correlations among other independent variables. In accordance with the Gauss-Markov 
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Theorem, given these assumptions, the estimators of alpha and beta are the most efficient 
linear unbiased estimators of alpha and beta in the sense that they have the minimum 
variance of all linear unbiased estimators.xxx  Finally a more acceptable assumption for OLS 
modeling: the error terms are normally distributed in the OLS.  
 
It would be possible to use autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH) 
odels and generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) models for 
non-co
ession inputs were from Commercial 
ortgage Alert (www.cmalert.com
m
nstant error term modeling. This application for CMBS spread modeling may give 
reason to support thy hypothesis that the variance of the error term is not a function of an 
independent variable, but instead varies over time depending on past magnitude of errors. 
As with inflation, interest rates, and stock market returns, there is often evidence of clusters 
of large and small errors.xxxi  ARCH and GARCH models could lead to increased efficiency 
as Gauss-Markov Theorem may have been violated.  
 
 The source data used to compute the regr
M ). From 22,581 possible data points, a subset of 1,589 data 
nal and time-series, is used for this study. The source 
ata from Commercial Mortgage Alert is a cross-sectional, as opposed to a time-series, 
points was used. The discarding of 92.96% of the source data could have severe implications. 
This massive amount of discarded data was due to frequently omitted necessary inputs such 
as at least one CMBS issue rating from one of the big three credit rating agencies, date of 
origination and pricing, originating spread over the benchmark, and the benchmark itself 
from the original source data. However, in comparison to the 1,179 observations used in 
Jadeja and Dorokov (2008), this study has gathered 34.78% additional data. Thus, embedded 
in this study is an assumption that the results from this study’s sample statistical analysis are 
consistent with the population’s statistical analysis results. This assumption could possibly be 
violated; however, there is no definitive resolution as there is no relative data to compare the 
sample against the population results. 
 
 A pooled data set, cross-sectio
d
measurement of various data at the CMBS origination date. The dependent variable in 
CMBS spreads and the four traditional issue-specific independent variables are classified as 
cross-sectional data; whereas, the ten CB LEI components are categorized as time-series data. 
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Thus, there is an implicit assumption that the methodology used to price of CMBS at 
origination is consistent throughout the 1998- 2008 period. This assumption is likely violated; 
however, time-series data for each CMBS issue would be sparse and intermittent due to the 
lack of liquidity and volume of trades on these securities. To the point, the CMBS spread at 
origination is assumed to be equivalent to an observed CMBS market spread. 
 
 As previously discussed, the two traditional issue-specific CMBS variables in LTV 
d DSC contain assumptions of an appropriate capitalization rate and predictions of 
ree time periods. Jadeja and 
orokov (2008) alleged that a four year cycle is sufficient time to draw conclusions regarding 
gging variables from the LEI components. Only the SPX and 
PR_10FF are recorded daily; whereas, the other eight variables are recorded either monthly 
 the following 
atistical analysis. None of them by themselves or as a collective group is likely to render 
an
incoming cash flows (NOI). The assumptions cannot be analyzed from the source data. 
Therefore, this is another possible source of error to consider. 
 
 The data set from 1998 – 2008 will be split into th
D
patterns and macroeconomic trends characteristic of the respective period. This explicit time 
period separation is also necessary to contrast the results from this study to those of Jadeja 
and Dorokov (2008). Results could vary widely depending on the time periods chosen; thus, 
careful judgment with economic intuition for separating periods of contraction and 
expansion is critical for this study’s results. However, a full time period analysis could 
provide some perspective.  
 
 There are implicit la
S
or weekly. This will certainly distort the regression line fit the further these variables are 
regressed from their recorded date. There is no solution for this issue as daily data does not 
exist for these eight variables. Thus, we need to keep in mind that the final coefficient of 
determination with any of these eight LEI components is likely understated. 
 
 There are many questionable assumptions explicit and implicit in
st
this study’s statistical analysis in absolute futility. OLS modeling assumptions are frequently 
violated in practice still yielding significant implications. Possible model misspecification can 
have serious impacts; however, being aware at every step of modeling methodology can 
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mitigate undesired errors. A sample size of an absolute 1,589 observations should 
approximate results derived from a significantly larger population. The assumption of CMBS 
spreads at origination being equivalent to hypothetically observed CMBS market spreads is a 
concern. However, there may be no superior procedure available and it is approximately 
correct. The exact time period separations, LTV and DSC variance, and frequency of 
recorded data measurement concerns are important to recognize; however, these concerns 
cannot definitively defeat any conclusions drawn from this statistical study on standardized 
CMBS spreads.  
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Input Data Specification Methodology 
 
From Commercial Mortgage Alert (www.cmalert.com), input data was filtered for 
ompletion of the following fields: date of origination, LTV, DSC, Country (Only $US 
evaluation 
riteria for CMBS. The input data included in this study requires at least one rating from any 
 independent variables, SUB, LTV, and 
SC, were not manipulated for the OLS regression inputs. However, a couple of the time-
 
 
c
denominated US CMBS issues are included in this study of variables affecting standardized 
CMBS spreads), rating (at least one valid rating from any of the big three rating agencies), 
percentage of subordinate debt, specified spread in addition to the CMBS benchmark, and 
the CMBS benchmark. In order to compute final values for the dependent variable, each 
CMBS specific spread is added to the respective CMBS benchmark for each CMBS issue and 
tranch. Then this set of absolute CMBS spreads were standardized by subtracting the 3 
month US Treasury yield. This was the calculation for the standardized CMBS spread, 
dependent variable, for all the subsequent OLS regressions analyses in this paper. 
 
 With regards to ratings, S&P, Moody’s, and Fitch all use similar ratings 
c
of these big three rating agencies. For cases where a CMBS issue has multiple ratings, the 
priority is to use S&P, then Moody’s, then Fitch. The justification for this priority is derived 
from the highest to lowest number of outstanding rated CMBS issues. This specification 
mirrors that of Jadeja and Dorokov (2008). Ratings are initially scaled with a unified rating 
system as specified in Jadeja and Dorokov (2008).xxxii 
 
 The remainder of the traditional issue-specific
D
series independent variables in the LEI components required calibration. For inflation 
adjusted M2 (AM2), monthly non-adjusted M2 was taken and multiplied by a CPI figure 
scaled to a reading of 100 for base month and year, January 1998. Each month in the 
inspected time period from 1998 – 2008 is calculated in the same manner. The ten year US 
Treasury spread over the Federal Funds Rate was computed by the subtraction of the 
respective Federal Funds Target Rate from the daily ten year US Treasury spread for each 
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day for this study’s time horizon, 1998 - 2008. The other eight indicators were sourced and 
their raw data was used as inputs for the various OLS regressions. 
 
 For the following Regression Model 5, the natural logarithm of the computed 
ependent variable CMBS spreads was used. The economic intuition for using this 
ion Model 6, there is a gap distinguishing the investment grade CMBS 
sues and the non-investment grade CMBS issues. After multiple attempts of trial and error 
to narr
gression Model 7 assumes the gap value of 10 incorporated into the ratings 
dependent variable. And one step further, Regression Model 7 takes the natural logarithm 
 
d
mathematical function is that there is a supposed non-linear relation between spreads. In 
reality, the spread difference between two identical securities with AAA and AA rating is far 
smaller than the spread difference between two identical securities with CCC and CC rating, 
although both these examples are an absolute one rating separation. Utilizing the natural 
logarithm, this transformed CMBS spreads data provides a drastically improved coefficient 
of determination.  
 
On Regress
is
ow the possible intervals and find a specific value for this gap, a gap value of 10 
appears to be a decent approximation. The purpose of this regression model is to test 
whether there is a higher deserved weighting for investment grade versus non-investment 
grade CMBS. Pension funds, insurance companies, and other large financial institutional 
investors often are restricted to holding only or a very large portion of their assets in 
investment grade securities.xxxiii  An interesting discovery is that the gap value of 10 on this 
scale implies that the difference between investment grade and non-investment grade 
securities is approximately 10 grade steps, or more accurately between 5 and 15 grade 
steps!xxxiv  
 
 Re
in
of this value for each of the outputs. Thus, instead of taking the natural logarithm of the 
CMBS spread dependent variable and having each of the independent variables plot against 
it, attempting to take the natural logarithm of an independent variable in ratings thought to 
have a non-linear relationship to the dependent variable should yield a more precise, fine-
tuning method.  
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 Regression Model 8 incorporates Regression Model 7’s assumptions with the 
addition of adding the assumption in Regression Model 5, take the natural logarithm of the 
ependent CMBS spread variable.  
d used directly from the daily source data. 
 
 
 
d
 
 Finally, for Regression Model 11, the dividend yield data for the NA REIT 
Composite Index was unchanged an
 
 This explanation to the input data specification methodology has set the foundation 
for the succeeding statistical regression analysis discussion. 
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Regression Models: Report and Reconciliation of Results 
 
 The sourc ith the additions 
f the macroeconomic LEI components data are jointly tested as possible determinants of 
MBS spreads using OLS regression modeling. There are a number of hypotheses to 
a set and the more extensive 1,589 
bservation data set.  
SPRi = α + β1RATi + β2SUBi + β3DSCi + εi 
SPR = Standardized spr
AT = Rating issued for CMBS at date of origin 
UB = Percentage of subordinate debt for CMBS issue at origination  
r CMBS issue at origination 
 
e of the originating CMBS structures from 1998 – 2008 w
o
C
consider for this study: (1) a natural hypothesis is that the key driver of CMBS spreads will 
be the credit rating agency issued CMBS rating; (2) traditional issue-specific variables in SUB, 
LTV, and DSC are significant, but their variation should affect the CMBS spreads to a lesser 
extent than ratings; (3) there should be some explanatory value in some of the ten 
components of US LEI. As a group of variables, they should be significant and increase the 
explanatory power of the CMBS spreads regression model, even if some of these 
macroeconomic variables are insignificant by themselves; and (4) the dividend yield of the 
NA REIT Composite Index should increase the explanatory power of a specified model 
used to explain the variances of standardized CMBS spreads. The following Regression 
Models, 1 to 11, take the full data set from 1998 – 2008.  
 
 Beginning with the Jadeja and Dorokov (JD) (2008) Three-Factor regression model, 
a comparison is made between their 1,179 observation dat
o
 
 
 
 
ead on CMBS   
R
S
DSC = Debt-to-service coverage ratio fo
 
 36
  
Table A: Beta and T-stat results from JD (2008) 3-factor model 
β i /(T-stat) 
 
Period # of Obs. α RAT SUB DSC 
1998 – 2002 469 4.94 -0.20 0.00 -0.15 
    (35.43) (-1 2) (-4.58) 9.08) (0.9
         
2003 - 2006 2.96 529 -0.16 0.01 0.06 
    (22.20) (-17.91) (4.53) (4.23) 
         
2007 - 2008 181 2.91 -0.12 0.02 0.01 
    (4.94) (-3.88) (2.47) (0.15) 
         
1998 - 2008 1179 4.48 -0.21 0.02 -0.15 
    (41.86) (-27.39) (-9.11) (9.40) 
 
 
Table B:  Beta and T-stat results from Expanded Data Set with JD (2008) three-factor 
model specification 
 
β i /(T-stat) 
Period # of Obs. α Rating SUB DSC 
1998 - 2002 990 487.97 -20.24 -0.74 -10.41 
    (35.27) (-2 75) (-2.70) 0.52) (-2.
         
2003 - 2006 555.57 412 -33.05 2.98 7.79 
    (22.92) (-17.99) (6.20) (3.01) 
         
2007 - 2008 187 415.21 -17.12 0.65 -9.28 
    (13.74) (-8.71) (1.42) (-1.59) 
         
1998 – 2008 1589 482.00 -22.43 0.31 -3.20 
    (1.46) (-1.71) (45.60) (-28.12) 
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  Due to the difference in scaling where JD (2008) used spreads in percentage terms, 
this regressio  used spreads measured in basis points; thus, there is a factor of 100 to adjust 
ons, this data set has more than twice the 
e 
2008 periods. These differences disappear 
d significant for the RAT beta. 
ant. A natural prediction would be for the 
n
for. In contrasting the number of observati
observations for the 1998 – 2002 period than that of JD (2008), 990 versus 469. However, 
for the period of 2003 – 2006, the JD (2008) data set is larger, 529 versus 412 observations. 
The difference for the 2007 – 2008 period is negligible.  
 
 As expected, the alpha terms for both sets of data are positive and significant for all 
time periods and for the full data set. However, there are noticeable absolute valu
differences for the 2003 – 2006 and the 2007 – 
when comparing both data sets’ full time horizon from 1998 – 2008.  
 
  Also hypothesized, the beta for RAT is negative as the higher the rating, the lesser 
the CMBS spread should be due to lower risks, status quo. Both data sets for all time period 
variations are negative an
 
 However, the results for the SUB and DSC between both data sets are different. JD 
(2008) found that SUB and DSC are both significant; whereas, the extended data set 
concluded that SUB and DSC are both insignific
SUB beta to be positive as the higher proportion of subordinate debt should increase the 
risk in the CMBS security; and thus, it should lead to a higher compensating spread for 
investors. For the full 1998 – 2008 time horizon, both data sets have positive SUB betas. 
However, for each of the three separate time periods, the results between both data sets are 
mixed for significance and sign. Similar to SUB, the null hypothesis is a negative DSC beta. 
The higher the DSC is, the less likely the CMBS issue is to default due to increased 
compensating cash flows from the property to service debt. In the full 1998 – 2008 time 
horizon, the DSC beta sign was confirmed negative for both data sets; however, again, there 
are discrepancies for significance and sign when comparing the three separate time periods. 
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Table C: R2, F-stat, Critical F-stat, and DW-test from JD (2008) 3-factor model: 
Period R2 F-stat Critical F-Test DW-stat 
 
         
1998 – 2002 0.56 196.68 8.53 0.73 
         
2003 – 2006 0.51 184.14 8.53 0.76 
         
2007 – 2008 0.09 6.01 8.54 0.25 
         
Full Data 0.46 328.54 8.53 0.49 
 
 
Table D: Comparable R2, F-stat, Critical F-stat, and DW  results from the 
Expanded Data Set: 
-test
 
Period R2 F-stat Critical F-Test DW-stat 
         
1998 – 2002 0.45 271.44 8.53 0.82 
         
2003 – 2006 0.52 149.19 8.53 0.91 
         
2007 – 2008 0.40 40.12 8.54 0.65 
         
Full Data 0.44 418.12 8.53 0.77 
 
  
 From Table C and Table D, the coefficient of determination for 2007 – 2008 is 
ramatically different with a better result yielded from the expanded data set, R2 equal 0.40 
ectively. However, the expanded data set results in a slightly poorer fit with 
d
versus 0.09, resp
the 1998 – 2002 data and also the full 1998 – 2002 time horizon (a difference of 0.11 and 
0.02, respectively). F-stat were significant for all time periods in the expanded data set in 
contrasts to JD (2008) having an insignificant F-stat for the 2007 – 2008 time period. This 
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difference alone supports the added value of the expanded data set. Another premise to 
support the expanded data set is the higher DW-test statistics for each of the three time 
periods in conjunction with the full time horizon. Although, all computed DW-test statistics 
indicate the presence of positive correlation, the expanded data set yields higher DW-test 
statistics indicating a lesser likelihood for positive serial correlation. 
 
 With conflicting results for the three separated time periods, a more general focus is 
taken for the following Regression Models 1 to 11. The results appear more consistent and 
etter with a larger sample observation size and longer time horizon. Also, the choice of the 
ariables 
R
 
 
SPR = Standardize
RAT = Rating issued for CMBS at date of origin 
SUB = Percentage of subordinate debt for CMBS issue at origination  
ue at origination 
issue at origination 
b
specific separation of time periods requires additional scrutiny as it should have very 
significant effects on the regression time period specific results. 
 
 
Regression Model 1: Traditional Issues-Specific Independent V
 
 
SP i = α + β1RATi + β2SUBi + β3LTVi+ β4DSCi + εi 
d spread on CMBS   
LTV = Loan-to-value ratio for CMBS iss
DSC = Debt-to-service coverage ratio for CMBS 
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Table E: Beta and T-stat results from Regression Model 1: 
β i /(T-stat) 
 
# of Obs. α RAT SUB LTV DSC 
          
1589 453.93 -22.39 0.37 -0.78  0.28 
  (19.03) (-28.05) (1.33) (1.31) (-0.30) 
 
 
Table F: Regres n Mod ul st c t, -stat): 
 
R2 F-stat Critical F-stat DW-stat 
sio el 1 res ts (R2, F- at, criti al F-sta  and DW
0.44 314.16 5.63 0.78 
 
 
This model specification is similar to the JD (2008) three factor model with the 
dition of LTV. The sign for each beta value is consistent for each with the pre-regression 
alyses theoretical hypotheses. However, only the ratings variable and the alpha are 
statistic
ad
an
ally significant. The coefficient of determination at 0.44 for this model is still 
marginally lower than the JD (2008) benchmark at 0.46. However, the DW-statistic is higher 
and indicates less presence of serial correlation.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 41
  
Regression Model 2: Macroeconomic US LEI Component Independent Variables 
 
Di 
+ β7SPXi + β8AM2i + β9SPR_10FFi + β10CSIi + εi 
 
 
SPR = Standardized 
FG = Manufacturer average work week 
B = Initial jobless claims 
ble goods and materials new orders 
justed manufacturing excluding defense new orders 
x 
ersity of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index 
 
SPRi = α + β1MFGi + β2JOBi + β3ODR_CMi+ β4PMIi + β5ODR_XDi + β6BL
spread on CMBS   
M
JO
ODR_CM = Seasonally unadjusted dura
PMI = Purchasing Manager’s Index 
ODR_XD = Seasonally unad
BLD = New privately owned housing units authorized by building permits 
SPX = Standard and Poor’s 500 Inde
AM2 = Inflation Adjusted M2 
SPR_ 10FF = 10 year US Treasury and Federal Funds Rate Spread 
CSI = Expectations portion of the Univ
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Table G: Beta and T-stat results from Regression Model 2: 
βi /(T-stat) 
 
# o ORD_XD f Obs. α MFG JOB ORD_CM PMI 
1589 2292.7 -39.6 0 0 0.7 0 
  (3.39) (-2.47) (-4.8 ) (0.49) (-3.68) 1) (2.65
 
βi / stat) (T-
BLD SPX AM2 SPR_10FF CSI 
-0.6 0.1 0 -0.7 -2.4 
(-3.46) (4.86) (-0.04) (-0.13) (-3.58) 
 
 
Table H: Regre od su
R2 F-stat Critical F-stat DW-stat 
ssion M el 2 re lts (R2, F-stat, critical F-stat, and DW-stat): 
 
0.06 10.19 2.54 1.07 
 
 
 Due to the disparity of data recording uency be n each of the ten US LEI 
ariables, a depressed coefficient of determination was expected. However, the results do 
ate that the combination of all ten US LEI significantly contribute to the variation in 
 freq twee
v
st
standardized CMBS spreads, F-stat of 10.19 is greater than the Critical F-stat of 2.54. This 
model also exhibits lesser positive correlation than the JD (2008) benchmark, 1.07 versus 
0.48 DW-stat, respectively. The JOB, ORD_CM, PMI, ODR_XD, and AM2 beta variables 
round to zero and thus, it is not possible to conclude any of their beta signs to confirm or 
refute the null hypotheses. The theoretical predictions for LEI beta signs are positive for 
JOB and SPR_10FF and negative for the other eight variables: MFG, ORD_CM, PMI, 
ODR_XD, BLD, SPX, AM2, and CSI. The results from Regression Model 2 appear weak as 
the resulting beta signs appear mixed, but seven of the individual betas have statistically 
 43
significant T-stats. With seven individual statistically significant T-stats of the ten and a 
significant F-statistic for the group of ten US LEI components, there is merit for further 
analysis in order to possibly specify a model better than JD (2008) incorporating the CB LEI 
indicators. 
 
 
Regression Model 3: Traditional and Macroeconomic Independent Variables 
 + R_CMi  + 
β8PMIi + β9ODR_XDi + β10BLDi + β11SPXi  
+ β12AM2i + β 13SPR_10FFi + β 14CSIi + εi 
 
 
SPR = Standardized spre
AT = Rating issued for CMBS at date of origin 
UB = Percentage of subordinate debt for CMBS issue at origination  
ssue at origination 
issue at origination   
ders 
justed manufacturing excluding defense new orders 
x 
ersity of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index 
 
 
SPRi = α + β1RATi  β2SUBi + β3LTVi+ β4DSCi + β5MFGi + β6JOBi + β7OD
ad on CMBS 
R
S
LTV = Loan-to-value ratio for CMBS i
DSC = Debt-to-service coverage ratio for CMBS 
MFG = Manufacturer average work week 
JOB = Initial jobless claims 
ODR_CM = Seasonally unadjusted durable goods and materials new or
PMI – Purchasing Manager’s Index 
ODR_XD = Seasonally unad
BLD = New privately owned housing units authorized by building permits 
SPX = Standard and Poor’s 500 Inde
AM2 = Inflation Adjusted M2 
SPR_ 10FF = 10 year US Treasury and Federal Funds Rate Spread 
CSI = Expectations portion of the Univ
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Table I:  Beta and T-stats from Regression Model 3: 
βi /(T-stat) 
 
# of Obs. α RAT SUB LTV DSC 
1589 1925 -21.4 0 0.5 4.4 
  (3.85) (-27.01) (1.68) (1.37) (-0.14) 
 
-stat) βi /(T
MFG JOB ORD_CM PMI ORD_XD
-24.2 0 0 0.3 0 
(-2.04) (-5.81) (0.24) (-4.51) (3.03) 
 
βi /( t) T-sta
BLD SPX AM2 SPR_10FF CSI 
-0.6 0.1 0 -1 -2.6 
(-4.30) (5.98) (0.40) (-0.23) (-5.20)
 
 
Table J: Regressi e u
R2 F-stat Critical F-stat DW-stat 
on Mod l 3 res lts (R2, F-stat, critical F-stat, and DW-stat): 
 
0.49 107.57 2.13 0.84 
 
 
 Regression Model 3 results for the traditional issue-specific variables are consistent 
ith Regression Model 1. Only RAT is significant while SUB, LTV, and DSC were 
atistically insignificant at the 5% level. Also, Regression Model 2 results are similar to 
w
st
Regression Model 3; only PMI, AM2, and SPR_10FF are insignificant, while signs vary for 
US LEI components. However, with the fourteen-variable regression, the coefficient of 
determination is better than the benchmark of 0.46 and yields a DW-statistic that is again 
better than the JD (2008) benchmark indicating lesser evidence of serial correlation. 
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Although Regression Model 3 yield better results than the JD (2008) three-factor model, the 
additional eleven factors added only incremental explanatory value for standardized CMBS 
spread variation. The model specifications that follow will include economically and 
statistically intuitive transformations in attempt to yield a more reality conforming model 
than this cumbersome fourteen-variable model. 
 
 
Regression Model 4: Statistically Significant Traditional and Macroeconomic Independent 
Variables 
SPRi = α + β 2MFGi + β3JOBi + β4ODR_CMi + β5ODR_XDi  
+ β6BLDi + β7SPXi + β8CSIi + εi 
 
SPR = Standardized spread o
AT = Rating issued for CMBS at date of origin   
FG = Manufacturer average work week 
nd materials new orders 
cturing excluding defense new orders 
 housing units authorized by building permits 
Index 
 
 
1RATi + β
 
n CMBS 
R
M
JOB = Initial jobless claims 
ODR_CM = Seasonally unadjusted durable goods a
ODR_XD = Seasonally unadjusted manufa
BLD = New privately owned
SPX = Standard and Poor’s 500 Index 
CSI = Expectations portion of the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46
  
Table K:  Beta and T-stats results from Regression Model 4: 
βi /(T-stat) 
 
# of Obs. α RAT MFG JOB ODR_CM 
1589 2024.8 -21.5 -25 0 0 
  (6.69) (-36.30) (3.58) (-3.35) (-6.03) 
 
staβi /(T- t) 
O D  DR_X BLD SPX CSI 
0 -0.5 0.1 -2.6 
(-6.84) (-4.60) .95) (-6.10) (5
 
 
Table L: Regression M esul -s tic t, and DW-stat): 
R2 F-stat Critical F-stat DW-stat 
odel 4 r ts (R2, F tat, cri al F-sta
 
0.49 187.98 2.93 0.84 
 
 
 Only incorporating statistically significant variables from Regression Model 3, 
egression Model 4 has an equivalent coefficient of determination of 0.49 and DW-statistic. 
his model yields another positive result including a higher F-stat, 187.98 versus 107.57 in 
R
T
Regression Model 3. Thus, this eight factor model including RAT, MFG, JOB, ORD_CM, 
ODR_XD, BLD, SPX, and CSI is a superior and more concise model than the cumbersome 
Regression Model 3. All eight independent variables are statistically significant.  
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Regression Model 5: ln(SPRi) w/ Traditional and Macroeconomic Independent Variables 
+ β8PMIi + β9ODR_XDi + β10BLDi + β11SPXi  
+ β12AM2i + β13SPR_10FFi + β14CSIi + εi 
SPR = Standardized spre
RAT = Rating issued for CMBS at date of origin 
SUB = Percentage of subordinate debt for CMBS issue at origination  
ssue at origination 
issue at origination   
ders 
justed manufacturing excluding defense new orders 
x 
ersity of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index 
 
 
ln(SPRi) = α + β1RATi + β2SUBi + β3LTVi+ β4DSCi + β5MFGi + β6JOBi + β7ODR_CMi  
 
 
ad on CMBS 
LTV = Loan-to-value ratio for CMBS i
DSC = Debt-to-service coverage ratio for CMBS 
MFG = Manufacturer average work week 
JOB = Initial jobless claims 
ODR_CM = Seasonally unadjusted durable goods and materials new or
PMI = Purchasing Manager’s Index 
ODR_XD = Seasonally unad
BLD = New privately owned housing units authorized by building permits 
SPX = Standard and Poor’s 500 Inde
AM2 = Inflation Adjusted M2 
SPR_ 10FF = 10 year US Treasury and Federal Funds Rate Spread 
CSI = Expectations portion of the Univ
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Table M: Beta and T-stats from Regression Model 5: 
βi /(T-stat) 
 
# of Obs. α RAT SUB LTV DSC 
1589 8.04 -0.13 -0.01 0.01 0.06 
  (2.65) (-27.27) (4.10) (3.05) (-4.61) 
 
T-stat) βi /(
MFG JOB ORD_CM PMI ORD_XD 
0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
(1.20) (-6.40) (-1.20) (-6.11) (2.59) 
 
-stat) βi /(T
BLD SPX AM2 SP  R_10FF CSI 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
(-5.36) (8.99) (0.36) (-0.18) (-8.48) 
 
 
Table N: Regres d su , F-stat, critical F-stat, and DW-stat): 
R2 F-stat Critical F-stat DW-stat 
sion Mo el 5 re lts (R2
 
0.57 148.65 2.13 0.49 
 
 
 Regression Model 5 is a slight digression from Regression Model 4. There is 
conomic intuition that standardized CMBS spreads do not have a linear relationship to 
any traditional issue-specific and macroeconomic variables. This model is a generalized test 
e
m
to uncover this premise. The results are interesting: all four traditional variables in RAT, 
SUB, LTV, and DSC are statistically significant; however, SUB and DSC have theoretically 
contradicting signs (although the absolute beta value is miniscule at -0.01 and 0.06). The 
previously insignificant US LEI variables in PMI, AM2, and SPR_10FF are still insignificant; 
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however, now MFG has also become insignificant. It is important to note that the already 
small absolute value of beta coefficients observed for Regression Model 3 is further 
minimized in Regression Model 5. However, it is tough to argue against the statistically 
significant and much higher coefficient of determination of 0.57 versus 0.49; however, this is 
at the expense of additional presence of serial correlation with a 0.49 DW-stat, in contrast to 
the 0.84 DW-statistic for Regression Model 3. Note that 0.49 DW-statistic is the reading for 
the JD (2008) three-factor model. From this model specification, there is probability that 
natural logarithm modeling could lead to improved model specification, thus, confirming 
economic rationale. 
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Regression Model 6: Traditional (incorporating an investment grade ratings gap of ten) 
and Macroeconomic Independent Variables 
SPRi = α + β1[RATi,( i+ β4DSCi + β5MFGi + 
β6JOBi + β7ODR_CMi + β8PMIi + β9ODR_XDi + β10BLDi + β11SPXi  
+ β12AM2i + β13SPR_10FFi + β 14CSIi + εi 
 
 
SPR = Standardized spre
AT = Rating issued for CMBS at date of origin 
UB = Percentage of subordinate debt for CMBS issue at origination  
ssue at origination 
issue at origination   
ders 
justed manufacturing excluding defense new orders 
x 
ersity of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index 
 
 
+10 if investment grade)] + β2SUBi + β3LTV
ad on CMBS 
R
S
LTV = Loan-to-value ratio for CMBS i
DSC = Debt-to-service coverage ratio for CMBS 
MFG = Manufacturer average work week 
JOB = Initial jobless claims 
ODR_CM = Seasonally unadjusted durable goods and materials new or
PMI = Purchasing Manager’s Index 
ODR_XD = Seasonally unad
BLD = New privately owned housing units authorized by building permits 
SPX = Standard and Poor’s 500 Inde
AM2 = Inflation Adjusted M2 
SPR_ 10FF = 10 year US Treasury and Federal Funds Rate Spread 
CSI = Expectations portion of the Univ
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Table O: Beta and T-stats from Regression Model 6: 
βi /(T-stat) 
 
# of Obs. α RAT SUB LTV DSC 
1589 1872.1 -18.3 -0.2 0.6 5.9 
  (4.02) (-32.73) (2.19) (1.95) (-1.01) 
 
-stat) βi /(T
MFG  M D JOB ORD_C PMI ORD_X
-19.5 0 0 0.7 0 
(-1.76) (-6.30) (4.16) (0.70) (-6.08) 
 
βi stat) /(T-
BLD SPX AM2 SP  R_10FF CSI 
-0.5 0.1 0 -4.1 -3 
(-4.06) (6.92) (1.03) (-1.08) (-6.36) 
 
 
Table P: Regres d su vario ng “g es: 
(R2, F-stat, critical F-stat, and DW-stat): 
sion Mo el 6 re lts for us Rati ap” valu
 
  R2 F-stat Critical F-stat DW-stat 
Gap = 1 0.50 113.63 2.13 0.84 
Gap = 5  0.54 131.93 2.13 0.85 
Gap = 10 0.56 140.20 2.13 0.90 
Gap = 15 0.55 138.31 2.13 0.95 
Gap = 20 0.54 132.82 2.13 0.98 
 
  
 For Regression Model 6, the basis ression el 3 wit  transformation of 
e RAT data to include a hypothetical “gap” between investment grade and non-investment 
sues. In the JD (2008) study, JD utilized a unified and linear scale for 
 is Reg  Mod h the
th
grade CMBS is
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assigning and quantifying CMBS ratings. However, in the investment world reality with 
established financial institutions, there are many constraints that often preclude non-
investment grade securities. Thus, there is a “gap” in reality between these divisions.xxxv   
 
 The primary issue is to test if this theory of a ratings “gap” between investment 
grade and non-investment grade securities is confirmed by the regression models. The 
condary issue is to approximate a decent “gap” value for subsequent regression models. 
PX, and CSI; however, the specific significant variables in this model are 
ot exactly identical to Regression Model 3. LTV was statistically insignificant in Regression 
 
 
se
From Table P, it is evident that the “gap” in fact does exist according to the result’s 
implications. Each of the coefficients of determination for the various “gap” model values 
yields a statistically significant and higher R2 than without the “gap” (Regression Model 3 
yielded a 0.49 R2). 
 
 For the beta coefficients, eight of them were significant: RAT, LTV, JOB, ODR_CM, 
ODR_XD, BLD, S
n
Model 3, while MFG was statistically significant. A “gap” value of 10 yielded the highest R2 
of 0.56 and is, therefore, a better predictor for standardized CMBS spreads than Regression 
Model 4 at 0.49.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 53
  
egression Model 7: Traditional (incorporating an investment grade ratings gap of ten, 
then taking the natural logarithm of the computed value) and 
Macroeconomic Independent Variables 
 
SPRi = α + β1ln[RATi, 3LTVi+ β4DSCi + β5MFGi + 
β6JOBi + β7ODR_CMi + β8PMIi + β9ODR_XDi + β10BLDi + β11SPXi  
+ β12AM2i + β13SPR_10FFi + β14CSIi + εi 
 
SPR = Standardized spre
AT = Rating issued for CMBS at date of origin 
UB = Percentage of subordinate debt for CMBS issue at origination  
ssue at origination 
issue at origination   
ders 
justed manufacturing excluding defense new orders 
x 
ersity of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index 
R
 
(+10 if investment grade)] + β2SUBi + β
 
ad on CMBS 
R
S
LTV = Loan-to-value ratio for CMBS i
DSC = Debt-to-service coverage ratio for CMBS 
MFG = Manufacturer average work week 
JOB = Initial jobless claims 
ODR_CM = Seasonally unadjusted durable goods and materials new or
PMI = Purchasing Manager’s Index 
ODR_XD = Seasonally unad
BLD = New privately owned housing units authorized by building permits 
SPX = Standard and Poor’s 500 Inde
AM2 = Inflation Adjusted M2 
SPR_ 10FF = 10 year US Treasury and Federal Funds Rate Spread 
CSI = Expectations portion of the Univ
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Table Q: Beta and T-stats from Regression Model 7: 
βi /(T-stat) 
 
# of Obs. α RAT SUB LTV DSC 
1589 2304.8 -328.9 -0.8 0.7 6.6 
  (5.22) (-37.05) (2.60) (2.33) (-5.01) 
 
stat) βi /(T-
MFG  M D JOB ORD_C PMI ORD_X
-14.3 0 0 0.9 0 
(-1.36) (-6.46) (5.16) (0.90) (-7.33) 
 
 
 
 
Table R: Regres d su , F-stat, critical F-stat, and DW-stat): 
R2 F-stat Critical F-stat DW-stat 
sion Mo el 7 re lts (R2
 
0.60 169.01 2.13 0.96 
 
 
 Regression Model 7 is an evolution of Re n Model 6. As previously discussed, 
ere is economic and statistic reasons to assume non-linearity relationships between select 
ariables. This non-linearity is incorporated by natural logarithmic modeling. Regression 
βi stat) /(T-
BLD SPX AM2 SP  R_10FF CSI 
-0.5 0.1 0 -5.2 -3.3 
(-3.92) (7.64) (1.18) (-1.44) (-7.52) 
gressio
th
v
Model 5 yielded stellar relative results with natural logarithmic modeling of the standardized 
CMBS spread; however, it was too general and a logical hypothesis would be to evaluate 
each variable for a possible non-linear relationship with SPR. Thus, Regression Model 7 
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factors in a ratings “gap” value of ten for investment grade CMBS issues and transforms the 
data with a natural logarithm function.  
 
 The results for this model specification are encouraging. This iteration has ten 
atistically significant of the fourteen possible independent variables. This is the highest st
number of statistically significant independent variables for the SPR modeling sequence. 
Only MFG, PMI, AM2, and SPR_10FF are insignificant variables. Furthermore, the four 
traditional issue-specific variables in RAT, SUB, LTV, and DSC are each statistically 
significant. The 0.60 R2 is the highest in all iterations thus far along with a high F-statistic of 
169.01 and substantially better than the JD (2008) benchmark DW-statistic with 0.96. The 
fine-tuning and transformation of the RAT variable led to improved results. 
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Regression Model 8: ln(SPRi) and Traditional (incorporating an investment grade ratings 
gap of ten, then taking the natural logarithm of the computed value) 
 
 
ln(SPRi) =  α + β1ln[RATi,(+10 if investment grade)] + β2SUBi + β3LTVi+ β4DSCi + 
β5MFGi + β6JOBi + β7ODR_CMi + β8PMIi + β9ODR_XDi + β10BLDi + β11SPXi  
 
 
PR = Standardized spread on CMBS 
AT = Rating issued for CMBS at date of origin 
for CMBS issue at origination  
ination 
 goods and materials new orders 
 Index 
g units authorized by building permits 
Federal Funds Rate Spread 
the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index 
and Macroeconomic Independent Variables 
+ β12AM2i + β13SPR_10FFi + β14CSIi + εi 
S
R
SUB = Percentage of subordinate debt 
LTV = Loan-to-value ratio for CMBS issue at orig
DSC = Debt-to-service coverage ratio for CMBS issue at origination   
MFG = Manufacturer average work week 
JOB = Initial jobless claims 
ODR_CM = Seasonally unadjusted durable
PMI = Purchasing Manager’s
ODR_XD = Seasonally unadjusted manufacturing excluding defense new orders 
BLD = New privately owned housin
SPX = Standard and Poor’s 500 Index 
AM2 = Inflation Adjusted M2 
SPR_ 10FF = 10 year US Treasury and 
CSI = Expectations portion of 
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Table S: Beta and T-stats from Regression Model 8: 
 
βi /(T-stat) 
# of Obs. α RAT SUB LTV DSC 
1589 9.82 -1.42 0.01 0.07 -0.02 
  (3.05) (-21.89) (-13.73) (4.10) (3.17) 
 
-staβi /(T t) 
MFG JOB ORD_CM PMI ORD_XD 
0.12 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
(1.63) (-6.02) (3.86) (-0.97) (-7.26) 
 
stat) βi /(T-
BLD SPX AM2 SPR_10FF CSI 
0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.00 
(-4.88) (9.04) (-9.07) (0.32) (-0.65) 
 
 
able T: Regression Model 8 results (R2, F-stat, critical F-stat, and DW-stat): T
 
R2 F-stat Critical F-stat DW-stat 
0.51 118.86 2.13 0.58 
 
 
Not predictably, Regression Model 8 results are inferior to Regression Model 7 
sults. From improved regression results yielded by Regression Model 5 for ln(SPRi) and 
 
re
Regression Model 7 for taking the natural logarithm of a “gap” adjusted RAT data, the 
natural hypothesis would be that a combination of these model specifications would lead to 
improved results again; however, this was not the case. The coefficient of determination 
dropped 0.09 or by 15%, the DW-statistic worsened significantly to 0.38, and the F-stat 
dropped. As likely as there are non-linear relationships, there are possible linear relationships. 
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By taking the natural logarithm of SPR and also of the RAT approximately cancels out the 
intention of non-linearity as yielded by Regression Model 7. Thus, Regression Model 7 with 
its ten statistically significant independent variables is the final model specification for 
modeling SP 
 
 
Regression Model 9: Statistically Significant Traditional (incorporating an investment grade 
ratings gap of ten, then taking the natural logarithm of the computed 
 
 
SPRi = α + β1ln[RATi,(+10 if investment grade)] + β2SUBi + β3LTVi+ β4DSCi +  
β5JOBi + β6ODR_CMi + β7ODR_XDi + β8BLDi + β9SPXi + β10CSIi + εi 
 
 
PR = Standardized spread on CMBS 
AT = Rating issued for CMBS at date of origin 
for CMBS issue at origination  
ination 
ders 
justed manufacturing excluding defense new orders 
iment Index 
value) and Macroeconomic Independent Variables 
S
R
SUB = Percentage of subordinate debt 
LTV = Loan-to-value ratio for CMBS issue at orig
DSC = Debt-to-service coverage ratio for CMBS issue at origination   
JOB = Initial jobless claims 
ODR_CM = Seasonally unadjusted durable goods and materials new or
ODR_XD = Seasonally unad
BLD = New privately owned housing units authorized by building permits 
SPX = Standard and Poor’s 500 Index 
CSI = Expectations portion of the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sent
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Table U: Beta and T-stats from Regression Model 9: 
 
βi /(T-stat) 
# of Obs. α RAT SUB LTV DSC 
1589 1777.6 -328.2 0.7 7.7 -0.9 
  (27.20) (-37.20) (-5.27) (2.70) (2.89) 
 
t) βi /(T-sta
JOB ORD_CM ORD_XD BLD SPX CSI 
0 0 -0.4 0.1 -3.6 0 
(-6.32) (5.31) ( (-10.44) (-10.03) (-4.13) 8.29)
 
 
able V: Regression Model 9 results (R2, F-stat, critical F-stat, and DW-stat): T
 
R2 F-stat Critical F-stat DW-stat 
0.60 235.67 2.54 0.96 
 
 
Regression Model 9 is the final model specification for the analysis of SPR. With ten 
atistically significant independent variables, all four traditional issue-specific variables and 
 
st
six of the ten US LEI components as variables, this model has achieved an R2 of 0.60, and 
high F-statistics and DW-statistics in contrast to the three-factor model from JD (2008). 
Regression Model 9 is the Ten Factor Hybrid Model specification. 
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Regression Model 10: Statistically Significant Traditional (without RAT) and 
Macroeconomic Independent Variables 
 
SPRi = α + β1SUBi + β2LTVi+ β3DSCi + β4JOBi + β5ODR_CMi  
+ β6ODR_XDi + β7BLDi + β8SPXi + β9CSIi + εi 
 
 
PR = Standardized spread on CMBS 
UB = Percentage of subordinate debt for CMBS issue at origination  
ssue at origination 
ders 
justed manufacturing excluding defense new orders 
iment Index 
 
S
S
LTV = Loan-to-value ratio for CMBS i
DSC = Debt-to-service coverage ratio for CMBS issue at origination   
JOB = Initial jobless claims 
ODR_CM = Seasonally unadjusted durable goods and materials new or
ODR_XD = Seasonally unad
BLD = New privately owned housing units authorized by building permits 
SPX = Standard and Poor’s 500 Index 
CSI = Expectations portion of the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sent
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Table W: Beta and T-stats from Regression Model 10: 
 
βi /T-stat 
# of Obs. α SUB LTV DSC 
1589 901.51 -3 1.91 .85 0.30 
  (-10.80) (-20.11) (-0.81) (0.52) 
 
βi /T-stat 
JOB ORD_CM ORD_XD BLD SPX CSI 
-0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.60 0.13 -3.39 
(  ( (-7.28) -5.33) (5.64) (-8.94) (-4.71) 5.50) 
 
 
able X: Regression Model 10 results (R2, F-stat, critical F-stat, and DW-stat): T
 
R2 F-stat critical F-stat DW-stat 
0.25 51.85 2.54 0.91 
 
  
The specification this regression formula and its analysis focus on the importance of 
le as a determinant for standardized spreads on the CMBS issues. From 
 
the RAT variab
Regression Model 10, the fall of 0.35 in the coefficient of determination is more significant 
than hypothesized leading to a final figure of 0.25 for Regression Model 10. This is a 58% 
drop in the explanatory power of the model omitting the RAT variable. Although there is no 
quantification of the degree of importance of the RAT, it is surprising that its effects 
outweigh the explanatory power of the other nine variables by 40%!  The F-statistic also falls 
dramatically to 51.85 from a figure of 235.67 in Regression Model 9. These results have 
fascinating real world implications. There is evidence to support the fact that investment 
managers depend disproportionately high on the ratings of an issue in contrast to other 
considered variables. This fact alone supports the higher than expected amount of 
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devastation that the ratings agencies have on the CMBS markets, status quo. The conflicts of 
interest that plague the underwriting and ratings issued from the perspective of S&P, 
Moody’s, and Fitch were understated. This is derived from the analysis of the importance of 
the RAT variable. 
 
  
Regression Model 11: Statistically Significant Traditional (incorporating an investment grade 
ratings gap of ten, then taking the natural logarithm of the computed 
 
 
SPRi = α + β1ln[RATi,(+10 if investment grade)] + β2SUBi + β3LTVi+ β4DSCi +  
β5JOBi + β6ODR_CMi + β7ODR_XDi + β8BLDi  
 
 
PR = Standardized spread on CMBS 
AT = Rating issued for CMBS at date of origin 
for CMBS issue at origination  
ination 
ders 
justed manufacturing excluding defense new orders 
iment Index 
vidend yield 
value) and Macroeconomic Independent Variables and US REIT 
Composite Index dividend yield 
+ β9SPXi + β10CSIi +  β11REITi + εi 
S
R
SUB = Percentage of subordinate debt 
LTV = Loan-to-value ratio for CMBS issue at orig
DSC = Debt-to-service coverage ratio for CMBS issue at origination   
JOB = Initial jobless claims 
ODR_CM = Seasonally unadjusted durable goods and materials new or
ODR_XD = Seasonally unad
BLD = New privately owned housing units authorized by building permits 
SPX = Standard and Poor’s 500 Index 
CSI = Expectations portion of the University of Michigan’s Consumer Sent
REIT = NA REIT Composite Index di
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Table Y: Beta and T-stats from Regression Model 11: 
 
tat 
 
 βi /T-stat 
# of Obs. α RAT SUB LTV DSC 
1589 8.53 -0.13  0.01 0.06 -0.01
  (-16.59) (-28.33) (  -4.47) (5.52) (3.12) 
βi /T-s
JOB ORD_CM ORD_XD BLD SPX CSI REIT 
0.00 0.00 0.00 01 0.00 -0.02 0.17  -0.
(-7.04) (-3.19) (-8.95) (3.05) (-8.06) (0.21) (9.73) 
 
 
able Z: Regression Model 11 results (R2, F-stat, critical F-stat, and DW-stat): 
 
T
R2 F-stat critical F-stat DW-stat 
0.59 229.54 2.54 0.51 
 
 
Even with the addition of the North American Real Estate Investment Trusts 
omposite Index Dividend Yield factored into Regression Model 9, the ten factor hybrid 
 
C
model from Regression Model 9 yielded a slightly higher R2. Thus, the null hypothesis that 
the NA REIT Composite Index Dividend Yield contributes significantly to the explanatory 
power of the standardized CMBS spreads is rejected. With the frequent daily recorded 
closing prices of the index and the associated dividend yield acting as a proxy for the 
standardized CMBS yield spreads, it was a natural hypothesis to believe that the NA REIT 
Composite Index Dividend Yield would contribute to a higher R2 for this model 
specification. However, this is not the case and the Ten-Factor Hybrid Model still yields the 
highest coefficient of determination. It is interesting to note that the T-stat is significant for 
the REIT variable at the 5% significance level. 
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JD (2008) Three-Factor Model versus Ten-Factor Hybrid Model with Expanded Data Set: 
For the following results these models share the same equation as Regression Model 
, the Ten-Factor Hybrid Model; however, each of these following regression models is 
able AA: JD (2008) Three-Factor Model results 
ritical F-stat DW-stat 
 
 
 
9
separated into time three periods: 1998 – 2002, 2003 – 2006, and 2007 – 2008, respectively. 
This is necessary in order to compare and contrast the original JD (2008) Three-Factor 
Model. 
 
 
T
 
  R2 F-stat C
1998 - 2002 0.56 196.68 8.53 0.73 
2003 - 2006 0.51 184.14 8.53 0.76 
2007 - 2008 0.09 6.01 8.54 0.25 
1998 - 2008 0.46 328.54 8.53 0.49 
 
 
able BB: The Ten-Factor Hybrid Model results 
F-stat DW-stat 
T
 
  R2 F-stat Critical 
1998 - 2002 0.65 185.17 2.54 1.06 
2003 - 2006 0.68 85.37 2.55 1.29 
2007 - 2008 0.70 41.03 2.57 1.10 
1998 - 2008 0.60 235.67 2.54 0.96 
 
 
From each time period’s coefficient of determination and DW-statistic, The Ten-
actor Hybrid Model is superior to the Three-Factor JD (2008) Model. In addition, all F-
statistics are significant.  
 
F
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Conclusion 
 Deteriorating lending standard tings issued by rating agencies, and 
xcessive greed on behalf of financial institutions involved were the fundamental causes for 
e CMBS market bubble. There are advocates warning of the CMBS crisis and its 
ndardized 
MBS spreads through various models. The final proposed model is the Ten-Factor Hybrid 
 β4DSCi + 
β5JOBi + β6ODR_CMi + β7ODR_XDi + β8BLDi + β9SPXi + β10CSIi + εi 
 
 
T separate 
me periods and for the full time period of 1998 – 2008 with respect to their metrics. Using 
e expanded data set for both models and for the full 1998 – 2008 time period, the Ten-
 
 
s, inflated ra
e
th
encompassing deep roots; however, it is unlikely that its adverse effects will rival that of the 
RMBS crisis due to the significantly larger US residential market, lesser relative supply of 
commercial real estate, and the flexibility of functions for commercial real estate.  
 
 The quantitative analysis in this paper has found many of The Conference Board’s 
Ten Leading Economic Indicators to be significant to the determination of sta
C
Model outlined in Regression Model 9. This specification includes all four traditional issue-
specific variables and six of the ten possible macroeconomic variables: initial jobless claims, 
seasonally unadjusted durable goods and materials new orders, seasonally unadjusted 
manufacturing excluding defense new orders, new privately owned housing units authorized 
by building permits, S&P 500 index, and the expectations portion of the University of 
Michigan’s Consumer Sentiment Index. Successfully incorporating a ratings gap between 
investment and non-investment grade CMBS and a natural logarithm transformation of this 
independent variable led to the specification for the Ten-Factor Hybrid Model: 
 
 
SPRi = α + β1ln[RATi,(+10 if investment grade)] + β2SUBi + β3LTVi+
his model is superior to the JD (2008) Three-Factor Model for all JD’s 
ti
th
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Factor 
ersus non-investment 
grade CMBS; (2) The importance of the ratings variable is overwhelming as it contributes 
more e
investment grade rating. Conversely, there are significant penalties, in form of higher yields, 
for not
t 
regulation and compliance will be regarded as an impediment to material abundance in the 
next bo
Hybrid Model yielded a coefficient of determination of 0.60, a significant F-statistic, 
and a 0.96 Durbin Watson statistic compared to the JD (2008) Three-Factor Model of 0.46 
R-square, a significant F-statistic, and a 0.49 Durbin Watson statistic.  
 
Critical points to note: (1) Quantifying the ratings gap to approximately ten steps 
gives perspective on the impressive magnitude of investment grade v
xplanatory power by itself than the nine other variables together in the Ten-Factor 
Hybrid Model; and (3) The inclusion of the daily dividend yield from the NA REIT 
Composite Index surprisingly did not improve the results and specifications of the 
standardized CMBS spreads model, though the variable itself was significant at the 5% level.  
 
There are interesting results and implications derived from this study. There is 
motive for the CMBS underwriters to collude with the ratings agencies to attain an inflated 
 having investment grade status. In practical terms, it is more likely that underwriters 
create a CMBS security that is marginally below investment grade and via agency capture, 
coerce the ratings agency to grant the CMBS issue at least a minimum of an investment 
grade rating. This hypothetical strategy would reap the underwriters the maximum gain at 
the expense of its naïve buyers, various financial institutions. Continuing with the ratings 
variable, there is evidence to support the premise that many buyers of CMBS issues depend 
excessively, almost to a fault, on the rating given to a specific CMBS issue from S&P, 
Moody’s, or Fitch. Thus, instead of spending time, effort, and resources to manipulate and 
justify subjective loan-to-value ratios and debt-to-service coverage ratios, it would be more 
efficient and effective to focus efforts on the ratings agency. Therefore, in order to have an 
unbiased and objective rating, conflicts of interests and agency capture must cease to exist.  
 
And finally, the finance industry continues to operate within the confines of an 
Entrepreneurial Worldview. Status quo, it would be reasonable to consistently predict tha
om market. Unless there is incentive for real structural and or philosophical changes 
for finance firms, history will repeat itself in some other shape or form.  
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Sources of Errors and Future Studies 
 
  
ry Least Squares (OLS) regression model. Inherit in 
y model employed are assumptions and simplifications of reality. The OLS model is very 
liers. It is a conscious choice not to discard any outliers for this study, 
rding of 92.96% of the comprehensive data should lead to a less convincing model. 
owever, unless there is an updated data source, it would take an eternity to manually search 
 This paper utilizes the Ordina
an
sensitive to out
although JD (2008) have subjectively omitted outliers (Thus, the results in this paper are 
understated and conservative!). Discarding outliers with a filter will certainly lead to better 
results, specifically a higher coefficient of determination. However, there are some 
assumptions that are likely violated, such as a homoskedasticity throughout the 1998 – 2008 
period.  
 
 A sample of 1,589 data points were taken from a population of 22,581 observations. 
The disca
H
for each swap benchmark for each CMBS issue from the Commercial Mortgage Alert 
(www.cmalert.com) source data. Another issue of concern is regarding the frequency of 
recorded values of each indicator. For example, there are daily observations for the S&P 500 
Index, weekly observations for initial jobless claims, and monthly observations for the 
Purchasing Manager’s Index. The further time elapsed from an observation point, the more 
erroneous the value becomes. Thus, it would be ideal to find daily records or possibly better 
proxies will be found or created. 
 
 However, the largest leap of faith is the assumption that the standardized CMBS 
spreads at origination would be identical to an observed traded CMBS market spread. This 
plicit assumption is questionable; however, this cross-sectional data is likely the most im
complete data available. If a time series data for CMBS spreads for each issue and tranch 
were to be analyzed, the regressions would be exponentially more complex and there will be 
issues for data completion. Unfortunately, the liquidity and trading volume of these CMBS 
issues are sparse and intermittent. Thus, a pure time series data set would unlikely yield 
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interesting insights as opposed to the pooled, combination of cross-sectional and time-series, 
data series used in this paper.  
 
 Future studies can build on the findings of this paper in many directions. Creating a 
filter rule and analyzing outlying data points individually would make for insightful findings 
ow much of an effect do outliers really have on the regression model?).  Other models (H
such as autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity and its general form, ARCH and 
GARCH, could be employed and specified to negate non-constant variance throughout the 
full period data. It could also be possible to separate time periods based on economic 
reasoning for differing periods of variance, as it is common to find clusters of high and low 
variances through time series. In addition, finding better proxies with more frequent 
observations or using countless other macroeconomic factors hypothesized to affect CMBS 
spreads may yield interesting results. Finally, due to the significance of the NA REIT 
Composite Index dividend yield, there are likely other REIT proxies that can be discovered 
to contribute significantly and simultaneously improve the R-square of the standardized 
CMBS spreads model. 
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